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 “A friend in Washington is someone who 
stabs you in the chest.”  Brent Scowcroft 
sometimes tells this joke to break the ice when 
beginning a speech.  The irony, though, is that 
Scowcroft has a great many friends and admirers.  
It is this capacity for friendship, together with his 
other personal qualities, his upbringing, military 
background, and intellectualism, that have made 
him so remarkably effective and so very much 
respected and, it is fair to say, so adored in 
Washington, around the country, and around the 
world. 
 
 To understand General Scowcroft’s 
success as a policymaker means returning to his 
family background—at least in part.  Brent 
Scowcroft (no middle initial) grew up in Ogden, 
Utah, in an unusually secure and nurturing 
environment.  Two of his great-grandfathers were 
captains leading “companies” of Latter-day 
Saints on their journey by foot from Omaha to the 
Great Salt Lake Basin.  One was Job Pingree, a 
successful merchant, prosperous banker—the co-
founder of the Pingree National Bank—large 
landowner, and one of Ogden’s first residents.  
The other was Richard Ballantyne, who Brigham 
Young selected to be one of “Seventy” of the 
Church of the Latter-Day Saints and was the 
founder of the Mormon Sunday school system.  A 
third, and Brent’s most famous great-grandfather, 
was John Scowcroft.  John Scowcroft founded 
Scowcroft & Son’s, a highly successful dry goods 
wholesaler, which became the largest such 
company between the Mississippi and the 
California coast.  Its best-known product was 
“Never Rip Overalls,” which in 1909 Scowcroft 
& Sons produced at the rate of two-thousand pairs 
per day.  By 1914, the company employed 250 
workers alone for fabricating overalls, work 
pants, and work shirts. 
 
 In 1925 Scowcroft was born into a family 
that was, as we see, established socially and well 
off materially; indicatively, his parents were 
married in the Mormon temple in Salt Lake City.  
By all accounts he had a happy childhood.  Brent 
was a member of the Boy Scouts, skied, played 
golf, and roamed around the Wasatch foothills 
with his friends, only blocks from his home.  As 
the youngest of three children and the only son, 
Scowcroft was, he concedes, “spoiled.”  Not once 
did he remember hearing his parents fight, and he 
never remembered feeling any tension at home.  
Later, reflecting on his upbringing, Scowcroft 
wryly observed that his idyllic childhood gave 
him a highly distorted view of his fellow 
humans.1F2  
 
Upon reading West Point Today in 1937, at the 
age of 12, he decided he wanted to go to West 
Point. Neither did the transformative effects on 
American society of the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor—which he remembers listening to radio 
broadcasts of with his parents—dissuade him 
from his dream. 
 
 Scowcroft attended a West Point prep 
program in Lafayette College in Easton, PA, 
where he overlapped with future senator Frank 
Church and Henry Kissinger, who were both with 
the Army Specialized Training Program.  In July 
1944 he started at the U.S. Military Academy, 
where he was a member of the last WWII cohort 
that had a three-year curriculum, because of the 
wartime need for more Army and Army Air 
Corps officers. Upon graduating in the top third 
of his class, he joined the Army Air Corps. 
 After training at air force bases in San 
Antonio and Chandler, Arizona—where to 
survive the desert heat they had to get up at 4:00 
a.m. to fly—he became a pilot for a Strategic Air 
Command fighter escort.  It was while on a dog-
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fight training exercise in central New Hampshire, 
in early January 1949 that “Scowcroft 
miraculously escape[d] death” (as the 
Manchester Union Leader reported).   The engine 
of his F51B Mustang failed at 2000 feet, too low 
an altitude to use the parachute, so Scowcroft 
tried to crash-land his aircraft.  After tearing loose 
some telephone cables, hitting a stone bridge, and 
missing a passenger bus by about a hundred 
yards, Scowcroft’s plane came to rest on a frozen 
marsh, just outside Derry, New Hampshire.  
 
 Scowcroft had two broken vertebrae as 
well as other, less serious injuries, but he was 
nonetheless in some ways fortunate: he could 
have easily been killed or paralyzed, and his 
plane, full of fuel, could have caught fire and 
exploded.  Confined to a plaster cast from waist 
up initially and having to spend two years in 
military hospitals because of complication, it was 
a difficult period.  Not only was he told that he 
would not be able to fly again, but barely a month 
after the crash he learned that his father, James 
Scowcroft, had died of heart failure.   
 
 The two had been close and Brent 
assumed that his father would help him learn the 
family business, which he would take up after his 
time in the Army.  But now, lying in hospital beds 
for months on end and with a career in the family 
business, absent his father, now much less 
appealing, Scowcroft realized he wanted to study 
national security and to contribute to U.S. 
national security. 
 
 The good news was that while at Valley 
Forge Army Hospital recovering from his broken 
back, Scowcroft met 1st Lt. Marian Horner, a 
nurse with the Army Air Corps.  Marian, “Jackie” 
to her friends, was vivacious, outgoing, and 
immensely capable.  She was a Roman Catholic 
from Syracuse, New York, two years older than 
Brent and, because of her great competence, 
positive attitude, and strong work ethic, had just 
been awarded the “Outstanding Nurse” at Valley 
Forge Army Hospital.  Brent and Jackie married 
in September 1951, in Sumter, South Carolina 
(where she was stationed) after Scowcroft had 
finally recovered after some complications and 
had spent several months at Mather Air Force 
base in central California. 
 
 It was also while Scowcroft was at Valley 
Forge Army Hospital that he received a letter 
from Col. Herman Beukema, the head of the 
Department of Social Sciences at West Point and 
the former head of the Army Specialized Training 
Program, who invited him to return to the U.S. 
Military Academy to teach.  After studying 
Public Law and Government at Columbia 
University for eighteen months and earning a 
Masters Degree, Scowcroft would teach for four 
years at his alma mater.  He was then billeted to 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, where he worked as the 
assistant air attaché, a position in intelligence, for 
two years and where he became acquainted with 
ambassador George Kennan.  Scowcroft was then 
assigned to teach at the Air Force Academy’s 
Department of Political Science, where he served 
as deputy department head and then department 
chair. 
 
 Scowcroft then went to work in the 
Pentagon under Maj. Gen. Richard Yudkin for 
several years.  He worked with U.S.-Latin 
American military relations, did Long-Range 
Planning, directed the Air Force’s component of 
Vietnamization, and assisted the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.  In between his various positions he 
attended the National War College and, with his 
performances, attracted the attention of his Air 
Force superiors.  
 
 It was no accident, then, that Gen. John 
Vogt selected Scowcroft as Nixon’s White House 
military assistant, upon the recommendation of 
Maj. Gen. James “Don” Hughes, who suggested 
that Scowcroft replace him as military assistant.  
Generals Hughes and Vogt figured that once 
Scowcroft took over as the President’s military 
assistant, he had the intelligence, academic 
training, administrative savvy, and personality to 
attract Kissinger’s attention.  They knew that Lt. 
Gen. Alexander Haig, deputy to National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, wished to 
return to the Army, and they wanted an Air Force 
officer to serve as Kissinger’s right-hand man, 
since the deputy national security advisor was the 
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first to brief the president each morning and was 
in constant contact with the President by virtue of 
Nixon’s role as commander in chief. 
 
 Were Scowcroft to become Kissinger’s 
new deputy, he would be well placed to learn of 
developments vital to Air Force interests, such as 
diplomatic breakthroughs or early versions of the 
federal budget.  Hughes and Vogt figured, too, 
that they would then be kept apprised of 
Kissinger’s plans.  Like other top Pentagon 
officers, they distrusted and feared Kissinger 
because of his unpredictable foreign policy and 
apparent influence over President Nixon.  They 
particularly disliked having the National Security 
Advisor tell them how many and what kind of 
missiles or bombers or fighters they could have. 
  
 As a stellar military assistant to the 
president—informed, competent, judicious, 
caring, solicitous—Scowcroft’s Air Force 
superiors were proven right: Kissinger selected 
Scowcroft to replace Haig.  Meanwhile, as 
military assistant, Scowcroft became close to 
President Nixon.  Nixon and Scowcroft 
cooperated closely in the handling of families of 
POWs and MIAs, and the president came to 
respect Scowcroft and to use him as sounding 
board.  And once Nixon appointed Kissinger as 
Secretary of State in Sept. 1973, Scowcroft 
became de facto national security advisor.  He 
continued on in that position under President 
Gerald Ford, until Ford appointed Scowcroft as 
national security advisor in November 1975.   
 
 As de facto national security advisor and 
then national security advisor proper, Scowcroft 
was closely involved in decisions on strategic 
weapons, SALT, military arms sales, U.S.-Iran 
ties, the U.S. resupply of Israel during the Yom 
Kippur War, the 1974-1975 Angolan crisis, and 
the handling of the intelligence scandals of the 
mid-1970s, among other issues.  He was 
particularly involved with the evaluation of South 
Vietnam in April 1975, which he essentially 
administered along with the assistance of his aide, 
Col. Robert McFarlane.  They monitored how 
many Americans and Vietnamese forces were 
taken out each day, using figures from the Saigon 
Embassy and Department of Defense, so as to 
calculate how many persons remained to be 
evacuated.  They coordinated actions with the 
State Department and the Pacific Command.   
Mostly, though, they simply tried to impose order 
and ensure a modicum of cohesion on what 
Scowcroft called a “confusing, crazy” mess.  But 
to Scowcroft’s and the administration’s credit, 
the military was able to evacuate 130,000 
Vietnamese in April 1975, ten times the number 
planned for by the State Department.  In the final 
fourteen hours alone of April 29th and 30th, 
Marine helicopters succeeded in lifting out 
almost 8,000 U.S. military personnel, Saigon 
Embassy officials, South Vietnamese, and their 
dependents.  The Vietnamese had their own name 
for the operation, “The Running.” 
 
 Notwithstanding the grim outcome of the 
Vietnam War, two close observers of the Ford 
presidency say that it was Scowcroft’s handling 
of the evacuation of Saigon that led him to 
appoint him to succeed Kissinger in Ford’s 
Halloween Massacre of November 2, shaking up 
his cabinet and top advisors. 
 
 Just two weeks later, Scowcroft excelled 
in his role as the manager, in effect, of the 
Mayaguez crisis.  The Mayaguez crisis was the 
“first real test” of President Ford’s leadership 
ability, according Robert Hartmann, Ford’s top 
political advisor.  Could President Ford, with his 
job approval standing at 39% (thanks to the 
Nixon pardon) be decisive?  Could the U.S. 
government save the ship’s crew (in contrast to 
the USS Pueblo, which was held for a year and 
whose crew was used as a propaganda instrument 
for North Korea)?  Could Ford operate under the 
newly imposed War Powers Act and still act 
presidentially?  Scowcroft excelled once again, 
and after three and half days, the Mayaguez crisis 
came to successful conclusion.  He was poised 
and calm under fire, something that could be 
attributed to his military training, self-possession 
and quiet self-confidence, and vision as a 
strategist—as someone who kept his eye on the 
big picture and long-term stakes.   
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 This calm under fire was only one of 
Scowcroft’s distinguishing characteristics.  
Whether as an air attaché, post-graduate student 
at the Joint Forces Staff College and the National 
War College, or teacher at West Point and the Air 
Force Academy, almost all Scowcroft’s superior 
officers regarded him as an unusual officer.  He 
was “exceptionally hard working” and bright,” 
and “showed “a maturity of thought and grasp of 
academic problems uncommon in officers of his 
grade and service.”  He performed his duties with 
“outstanding understanding, intelligence, skill, 
and judgment,” and also possessed an “iron will.”  
Scowcroft’ superior officers at West Point, in the 
Pentagon, and elsewhere consistently remarked 
on his inquisitive intelligence, his obvious 
brilliance, and his uncommon ability to grow in 
stature as the responsibilities he was given 
increased.  Revealingly, none of those evaluating 
Scowcroft’s military record, officers who were 
among the most senior in the Air Force once 
Scowcroft was promoted to colonel, could 
determine a ceiling on his ability to take 
additional responsibility; Scowcroft’s growth 
potential was considered “unlimited.” 
 
 In March 1971, Scowcroft received the 
“Award of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification 
Badge” for his “important and loyal service in a 
position of responsibility in support of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.”  In December 1971, the Air 
Force awarded him the Legion of Merit: “Lt. Col. 
Brent Scowcroft distinguished himself by 
exceptionally meritorious conduct in the 
performance of outstanding service to the United 
States.”  His “exemplary ability, diligence, and 
devotion to duty were instrumental factors in the 
resolution of many complex problems of major 
importance to the Air Force.”  Scowcroft also 
received the Air Force’s Distinguished Service 
Medal in recognition of Scowcroft’s “penetrating 
analyses and consistently sound judgment and 
advice on matters developed for consideration of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealing with the most 
significant aspects of our military posture and 
national strategic policy.”  
 Scowcroft’s success as a military 
officer—he was a “five percenter,” one of the 
“water walkers”—as a policymaker, and as a 
presidential adviser was the product of several 
interacting factors.  He was—and is—dedicated 
to public service, whether on behalf of the U.S. 
Air Force, the Department of Defense, the White 
House, or the United States itself, and a very hard 
worker.  Robert Gates, a close friend of 
Scowcroft, spoke of his friend’s seriousness.   
Gates observed that Brent enjoys talking about 
national security even when off duty, during his 
free time. At the same time, he was creative, 
resourceful, and even entrepreneurial in his 
dealings with the military bureaucracy and other 
in the government in the pursuit of his objectives 
and those of his superior officers or the U.S. 
president. 
 
 During the Bush administration, he 
would get up at 4:45 a.m. and then often go to bed 
after midnight.  What most do not appreciate, 
though, is that in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s 
Scowcroft often had to go home during the day to 
take care of his ill wife.  He then also had to take 
care of her the first thing in the morning and then 
on the weekends.  So President Bush never 
seemed to mind if Scowcroft nodded off in the 
middle of a meeting. (It was this capacity to 
catnap and then wake up as though nothing had 
happened, that induced President George H. W. 
Bush to create the “Scowcroft Award” for those 
who were able to nod off and then wake up 
without missing a beat.)   
 
 When his superiors decided on a course 
of action, Scowcroft could thus be counted on 
carrying it out.  And with his cheerful and 
straightforward demeanor, his quiet leadership, 
and the force of his own example, he was able to 
disarm or deflect almost all potential personal 
clashes or bureaucratic conflicts.  Scowcroft had 
the ability to divorce his ego from his 
professional performance, a trait that 
distinguished Scowcroft from most other high-
ranking officers and policy experts.  He accepted 
the decisions being handed down, irrespective of 
whatever position he had taken previously, and 
did not question, complain, or challenge the 
decisions being made.  Neither did he attempt to 
maneuver around them by going over the heads 
of his bosses or leaking his opposition to the 
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press.  Nor did he passively resist his superiors’ 
directives by delaying their implementation or 
ignoring them, both of which are tactics 
frequently officials used by disgruntled 
subordinates to avoid having to take actions that 
happen to run contrary to their own preferences. 
 
 On occasion, some of his colleagues 
thought he had an “irritating edge” (as Gen. Colin 
Powell put it), but everyone knew he walked the 
talk.  As President Bush once said, Scowcroft 
“didn’t want anything.”  Indeed, Scowcroft once 
told me that there is never a reason to be selfish.  
When pressed, he conceded that an exception 
might be when getting sick; but even so, this 
attitude is indicative of Scowcroft’ remarkable 
ethos. 
 
  Scowcroft’s behavior thereby caused his 
colleagues to see him as at once the quintessential 
team player and an independent-minded officer 
of impeccable integrity.  People recognized he 
was acting on behalf of the Air Force, the 
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, or the 
President of the United States—whichever the 
case may have been—and they trusted him.  They 
knew he was not trying to enhance his own 
reputation or to feather his own nest.  He 
succeeded at appealing to his colleagues’ better 
angels.  
 
 Then there is Scowcroft’s good humor.  
He enjoyed playing practical jokes; he is affable 
and friendly; and he was supportive and 
solicitous of his subordinates.  He laughs a lot; he 
is a genial man.  Although Scowcroft and Dick 
Cheney fell out in 2001 and have remained 
estranged, when they were both in the Ford 
administration, Sgt. Bill Gulley, Scowcroft’s 
successor as the White House military assistant, 
called Scowcroft and Cheney the White House’s 
two most-loved men.  And Richard Haass, who 
headed the Middle East desk on the NSC staff 
under Bush 41 and in 2016 was the president of 
the Council of Foreign Relations, has said that the 
Bush administration was the most collegial of any 
of the four administrations in which he served.  
Working there “was actually fun,” he said.  “It 
sounds bizarre, but it was by far the most 
enjoyable experience a lot of us had had before or 
since in government.  There was a lot of 
camaraderie and kidding around…it was very 
relaxed.” 
 
 In addition, Scowcroft was an 
intellectual.  He was curious about the Cold War 
and international communism, and Russian and 
Soviet history—which is why being an 
intelligence officer in Yugoslavia, then under 
Marshal Josip Tito, attracted him—and he 
pursued his doctorate at Columbia University in 
1966 (although the dissertation was not 
completed until 1967).  He wrote a paper on 
“Deterrence and Strategic Superiority” for the 
National War College, which he published in the 
foreign policy journal Orbis (Summer 1969).  He 
worked closely and said he learned a lot from 
General Yudkin, who the writer Fred Kaplan 
describes as the “intellectual master” of the new 
generation of Air Force staff officers who were 
studying nuclear warfare in the 1960s.  And over 
the course of his career he wrote about one 
hundred op-eds (many with co-authors, to be 
sure), many commission reports, and several 
chapters for edited books, and co-authored A 
World Transformed with George Bush and 
America and the World with Zbigniew 
Brzezinski. 
 
 Whether acting as deputy national 
security advisor, national security advisor, head 
of the President Reagan’s Commission on 
Strategic Forces, one of three members of the 
Tower Commission investigating Iran-contra, 
national security advisor under President George 
Bush, policy adviser, or writer, Scowcroft tried to 
think five-to-ten years down the road, beyond the 
short-term hiccups and temporary crises.  In this 
sense we can think of him a strategist, albeit with 
a small “s.”  Scowcroft may not be a Clausewitz 
or a Sun Tzu, but he thinks long term and looks 
at all the pieces in play, thanks to his deep 
knowledge of world history and close study of 
international relations.  “This is where I believe 
in the importance of history,” Scowcroft says.  
The study of history taught him about “how 
countries behave” and helped him to remain 
objective about people, events, institutions, and 
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forces—their origins, their likely interactions, 
and the possible future results. 
 
 The upshot of Scowcroft’s many 
abilities, and a principal key to his remarkable 
effectiveness, is his multivocality.  He has the 
rare ability to speak to and thereby span separate 
audiences—a quality more frequently found 
among presidents and leading politicians than 
military officers and nationals security experts.  
One of his voices is that of a diplomat, 
international-relations expert, and foreign-policy 
practitioner, whether expressed in small groups, 
in public speeches, or in his writing.  He is 
thereby able to speak to journalists, academics, 
and interested members of the public about 
national security and U.S. interests more 
generally, which he has done more recently with 
the situation in Iran nuclear agreement and 
Russian aggression in Ukraine.2F3  
 
 Another voice he has is that of a military 
leader.  As a former Pentagon staff officer and 
retired Air Force general, he learned how 
government worked, figured out how to secure 
others’ “buy-ins” so as to be able to fashion, 
coordinate, and carry out White House and U.S. 
government policy, and understands the ways of 
the complex government bureaucracy.  Absent 
access to the levers of power and without the 
ability to execute policy skillfully, a would-be 
strategist is merely an armchair theorist.  A 
military analyst cannot be a strategist if his plans 
are not accepted by decision leaders and then 
implemented by the armed forces, just as a 
political consultant is no electoral strategist if she 
cannot control where her candidate gives her 
campaign speeches and how she spends her 
funds. 
 
 George Kennan is considered a great 
international strategist because of his 1946 “Long 
Telegram,” and his 1947 Foreign Affairs article, 
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which largely 
provided the conceptual underpinnings for U.S.-
Soviet Cold War policy.  By contrast, the decades 
Kennan spent writing at Princeton’s Center for 
Advanced Study and on his Pennsylvania farm, 
when presidents and policymakers all but ignored 
Kennan’s analyses and prescriptions, do not add 
to his resume as a strategist—as interesting as 
they may be to intellectual historians.  Similarly, 
Kissinger is famous, if controversial, for his (and 
President Nixon’s) strategic vision in regard to 
détente and SALT, the opening to China, and the 
US disengagement from Vietnam, as well as for 
the private advice he has given George H. W. 
Bush, George W. Bush, and other US 
presidents—and not the quality and volume of his 
analyses of US foreign policy that he has 
published in his many books and other writings. 
 
 Yet another voice is that of Scowcroft as 
an intelligence officer, where he was trained in 
intelligence operations, was an important 
consumer of intelligence, and, as national 
security advisor, was an important supervisor of 
intelligence work and commissioner of covert 
operations.  Not only did he play a central role in 
reforming covert actions after the intelligence 
scandals of the mid-1970s, but also, in 2001, 
headed an external review board for reforming 
the intelligence community. 
 
 In addition, there is Scowcroft’s voice as 
an expert on weapons and nuclear deterrence, as 
seen with his writings, his leadership of the 
Scowcroft Commission on Strategic forces, and 
his central roles in concluding the START and 
START II arms agreements.  It was no small fact 
that he opposed the so-called “Gang of Four”—
Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and 
William Perry—and their designs for a world of 
“zero nukes” as being naïve and simple-minded 
(since it is relatively easy for a national 
government to produce nuclear weapons).  The 
United States and its key NATO allies therefore 
needed to maintain a modicum of nuclear forces 
to maintain strategic deterrence. 
 
 Finally, with his family business 
background, his experience as an international 
business consultant in the late 1970s and 
throughout most of the ‘80s and after 1994 with 
the Scowcroft Group, his membership on 
corporate boards, and his appreciation for the 
economic aspects of U.S. national security, 
Scowcroft has had a highly credible voice with 
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respect to international commerce and American 
business. 
 
 For all of Scowcroft’s outstanding 
accomplishments and stellar career, there are two 
important points that need to be addressed.  One 
is the end of the Cold War, where the Bush 
administration did not offer a vision for an 
alternative future and where Scowcroft conceded 
that he had only known the Cold War over the 
course of his career.  As one foreign journalist 
wondered, “future historians will find it hard to 
understand why the United States, with the world 
at its feet, did not seize the opportunity it had 
itself created to install a new world order.”  
Although the Bush administration proposed a 
“new world order” in the fall of 1990, following 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the administration 
did not sustain its attention to the ideas and 
policies of a “new world order,” those based on 
universal rights, democratic government, the 
United Nations, and the actions of other 
international institutions.  So nothing followed 
the Cold War. 
 
 This criticism of Scowcroft, President 
Bush, and Secretary of State James Baker—that 
they did not prepare the United States for the 
world ahead—is partly true.  Scowcroft admitted 
that the Bush administration “didn’t have any 
great ideas about how the world was going to go.  
We were sort of batting around all the ideas: What 
was the world going to be like?  Would we be able 
to cooperate with the Soviet Union?  What was 
going to happen in China?  Was China falling 
apart?  There was a really wide-ranging 
discussion about what the future might look 
like….It’s all fuzzy other than the New World 
Order, which I wish I had never thought of.”  
Arguably, there was a failure of imagination at a 
moment of American global supremacy, at a time 
when it could have done the most good.3F4    
 
 Yet any judgment of the Bush 
administration’s failure to describe an 
overarching vision of U.S. grand strategy should 
be tempered with an appreciation of just how fast 
everything was changing.  It is easy to forget just 
how vast the political, economic, and ideological 
gulfs were that separated the United States and 
Soviet Union—or at least how vast they were 
perceived by those on both sides—and to forget 
the mutual fear and suspicion of both 
superpowers.  Conversely, it is all too easy to 
overlook just how quickly the situation changed. 
 
 Scowcroft acknowledged the 
overwhelming pace of events.  The Bush White 
House did all it could simply to keep on top of 
things, Scowcroft said; “there was a lot to digest.”  
He conceded that the administration “didn’t have 
a comprehensive strategy for a world that were 
moving to at a rapid rate.”  Events were 
happening “too soon,” too fast.  And he, President 
Bush, and Secretary of State Baker did not have 
the time to “find our feet, we were just trying to 
keep up with things.”  So it may be highly 
unrealistic to expect the Bush administration and 
the Washington policy community to assimilate 
all that was happening in such a relatively short 
period—much less for the White House to 
formulate, agree upon, and mobilize behind a 
new grand strategy.  Scowcroft himself described 
the administration as being in “limbo” until 
reelection.  
 
 By way of comparison, given just how 
much the Cold War defined the United States and 
the politics of the twentieth century, eight years 
elapsed between the end of the Revolutionary 
War and the ratification of the Constitution 
(1781-1789).  Nearly five years passed between 
the end of the Second World War and the 
emergence of a U.S. policy consensus on the 
nature of the Soviet threat and the need to contain 
global communism, as articulated in NSC 68 in 
April 1950.  So the last two years or so of the one-
term Bush presidency was almost surly too brief 
a period to reassess how the United States was to 
reorient itself in a transformed world.  “Maybe 
you can say we ran out of time or we ran out of 
gas,” Arnold Kanter told me.   
 
 But neither did the Clinton 
administration articulate or promulgate a new 
vision for American national security; nor did 
George W. Bush administration in its first eight 
months. 
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 What also merits attention is Scowcroft’s 
outspoken position on the invasion of Iraq after 
the events of September 11, 2001, where 
President George W. Bush and his top advisers 
refused to listen to Scowcroft’s many warnings 
about going to war against Iraq.  Not only did 
Scowcroft express his views in the Wall Street 
Journal in mid-August 2002, but he had previous 
written to a similar effect in the Washington Post 
in late 2001 and had said much the same, several 
times, on national television.  But it was the op-
ed in the Wall Street Journal, whose front page is 
virtually a bulletin board for the Republican 
Party, that created the great controversy.  
Scowcroft wrote, where the op-ed was an 
adaptation of remarks he had given Bob Schieffer 
on “Meet the Press” of Sunday, August 4:  
 
any campaign against Iraq, whatever the 
strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert 
us for some indefinite period from our war 
on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual 
consensus in the world against an attack on 
Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment 
persists, it would require the US to pursue 
a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, 
making any military operations 
correspondingly more difficult and 
expensive. The most serious cost, 
however, would be to the war on terrorism. 
Ignoring that clear sentiment would result 
in a serious degradation in international 
cooperation with us against terrorism. And 
make no mistake, we simply cannot win 
that war without enthusiastic international 
cooperation, especially on intelligence.4F5  
  
 Possibly the most dire consequences, 
Scowcroft reckoned, “would be the effect in the 
region for if the US was seen to be turning its 
back on the bitter Israeli– Palestinian conflict in 
order to go after Iraq, “there would be an 
explosion of outrage against us,” he added.  “We 
would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the 
Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to 
be a narrow American interest. Even without 
Israeli involvement, the results could well 
destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically 
facilitating one of Saddam’s strategic objectives.”  
And we know the rest.   
 
 The irony is not only was Scowcroft the 
chief initiator of the first Gulf War—persuading 
Bush and others in the White House that they 
needed to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait (a “war 
of necessity” in Richard Haass’s phrasing) to 
restore the status quo ante bellum—but the first 
Bush administration, like that of George W. 
Bush, had also not well planned the endgame.  
The difference, though, is that Scowcroft and the 
senior Bush administration erred on the side of 
caution, rather than overreach. 
 
 As a result of his outspoken dissent in the 
Wall Street Journal, Scowcroft became a persona 
non-grata: ignored by and estranged from his 
former friends and colleagues and vilified by 
Republicans and neoconservatives in public 
speeches and in the media.  Scowcroft 
nonetheless stayed in touch with the Bush White 
House and, following Bush’s reelection in 2004, 
worked with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, 
among others, to try to put U.S. foreign policy 
back on track.  And in early 2007, Scowcroft 
demonstrated once again his laudable ability to 
detach his ego from past experiences by giving 
his support to the troop surge in Iraq. As Elliot 
Abrams said to me, George W. Bush’s foreign 
policy advisers and Republicans more generally 
did not appreciate the fact that Scowcroft’s 
loyalty to the United States exceeded his loyalty 
to the Republican Party. 
 
 Once Scowcroft left public office in 
1993, he and his friends and former staff 
established the Forum for International Policy, a 
think-tank that morphed into the Scowcroft 
Group, which has become possibly the most 
prestigious and most influential of the many 
Washington-area international business 
consultants.  Although he has spent most of his 
time consulting, but has also run interference on 
occasion (as after the April 2001 Hainin Island 
incident), served on presidential commissions 
(such as the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
America’s Nuclear Future, from 2010 to 2012), 
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given speeches and interviews, and continued to 
weigh in on foreign policy.  He has also been on 
many corporate boards and has played invaluable 
roles with the Atlantic Council and Aspen 
Strategy Group.  In fact, he has served as an 
eminence grise to President Obama, as Jeffrey 
Goldberg points out in his recent Atlantic article.5F6  
 
 Scowcroft’s career acquired another 
dimension as he aged: he started receiving 
prestigious awards.  He says that he is proudest of 
receiving the Presidential Medal of Freedom (in 
July 1991) and the insignia of an Honorary 
Knight of the British Empire (K.B.E.) from 
Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace in 1993.  
But these are only two of many.  Other awards 
include the Eisenhower Institute’s “Eisenhower 
Leadership Prize” from Gettysburg College 
(1992); the Hudson Institute’s James H. Doolittle 
Award (1994); the Les Aspin Democracy Award 
from the Les Aspin Center for Government at 
Marquette University (2003); the Association of 
the U.S. Army’s George Catlett Marshall Medal 
(also in 2003); and the Andrew Wellington 
Cordier Award from Columbia (2005) for 
superior and distinguished public service. 
 
 Scowcroft has also receive the William 
Oliver Baker Award for service on behalf of the 
US intelligence community (2005); the Andrew 
J. Goodpaster Award for his exemplary service to 
the nation (2008); and the Grand Cross of the 
Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (2009).  In 2013, Scowcroft was elected 
into the National Defense University’s National 
Hall of Fame, received the Gerald R. Ford 
Foundation’s Medal for Distinguished Public 
Service, and was awarded the Ewald-von-Kleist 
Award for dedicated commitment to conflict 
management at the 2013 Munich Security 
Conference.  In May 2016, the Department of 
Defense gave him the DOD Distinguished Public 
Service Award, its highest civilian honor. 
 
 Many retired generals and admirals, 
politicians, policy experts and academics, and 
diplomats receive awards as they age, of course, 
but what distinguishes Scowcroft is the very 
number of prizes he has received, the prestige of 
those prizes, and the diversity of the bestowing 
organizations and of their separate reasons for 
recognizing Scowcroft.  The prizes speak to the 
almost universal respect others have for him and 
to the wish of many prominent politicians, 
policymakers, and institutions to recognize the 
quality and scale of Scowcroft’s achievements 
and contributions. 
 
 This public service took other forms, too.  
When former President George H. W. Bush 
established the Bush Presidential Library and the 
Texas A&M regents created the Bush School of 
Government and Public Service, they wanted to 
establish an affiliated research institute.  The 
Scowcroft Institute opened on November 10, 
2007, with Scowcroft himself endowing it with 
funds for scholarships, administrative support, 
grant programs, a major annual conference, and a 
chaired faculty position.  As importantly, he 
found other donors to help fund the Bush School. 
 
 Previously, in 2000, Scowcroft 
established a scholarship for West Point cadets, 
the Government Internships Endowment, which 
allowed the U.S. Military Academy to underwrite 
a cultural and professional immersion program 
whereby each summer, 30-50 cadets would be 
placed in the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Energy, the White House, and 
other departments and agencies of the U.S. 
government.  General Daniel Christman, a former 
Superintendent at West Point, said Scowcroft 
“felt so strongly about the necessity of young 
officers to have this identification with other 
religions, cultures, languages.”  
 
 In 2006, Scowcroft funded the Arnold 
Kanter Chair at the Atlantic Council’s Brent 
Scowcroft Center on International Security, and 
created a paid internship program at the Aspen 
Strategy Group for the purpose of selecting four 
outstanding college graduates interested in 
working on national security issues.  And in 2009, 
he established and endowed the “Brent Scowcroft 
Professorship in National Security Studies” at the 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies in the Department of Political Science at 
the U.S. Air Force Academy. 
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 From the perspective of Scowcroft’s 91 
years and with his productivity and energy 
beginning to wane, what can we say about his 
worldview and underlying philosophy?  As I see 
it, he has a vision of a world shaped by open 
markets, a world that needs—indeed, depends 
upon—U.S. leadership, and world that has 
benefitted from and has much more to gain from 
international cooperation.  Underneath 
Scowcroft’s understanding of human society and 
international relations is, it seems, an old-
fashioned, Burkean conservatism: a personal 
philosophy that recognizes human dignity, 
protects private property, and is skeptical about 
ambitious plans for human progress.  At the same 
time, Scowcroft assumes that political leaders are 
capable of reasoned negotiation and intelligent 
cooperation—consistent with Scowcroft’s 
emphasis on rigorous discussion of issues in the 
White House, his insistence on an intellectually 
honest and rigorous NSC process, his many op-
eds, articles, and commission reports, and his 
conversations with and advice to policymakers.  
 
 Scowcroft has been able to masterfully 
straddle the usually separate spheres of the affairs 
of state and democratic politics.  Scowcroft has 
been an invaluable participant in many top-secret 
deliberations on respect nuclear weapons, 
conventional arms, intelligence issues, American 
commercial interests, and international politics 
and diplomacy.  And even here, because of 
Scowcroft’s reserve and modestly, it is unlikely 
we shall know the full extent of his contributions.  
At the same time, Scowcroft has been remarkably 
effective as a policy adviser working within the 
constraints of American democracy—i.e., a 
United States ultimately ruled by its citizens 
acting through their elected representatives, 
including the U.S. president, and informed by a 
free press.  This is a world that values 
consultation, open debate, due process, and 
consensus building.  But it is also a world 
dominated by short-term considerations—
especially of the next round of elections.   
 In a highly competitive world where 
everyone “wants to toot his horn,” Scowcroft, his 
late friend Bill Gulley says, is “the last guy” to do 
that. “To understand Brent Scowcroft, you have 
to understand his humanity,” says Daniel 
Poneman, a former NSC colleague, a former 
partner in The Scowcroft Group, and a personal 
friend.  “Not just his intellect.  Not even just his 
judgment.  But his humanity.  It’s a genuine 
humanity that respects other individuals as 
individuals.  He knows who exactly who he is and 
he is very comfortable with who he is. He feels 
fortunate to have had things happen to him that 
he never could have dreamed of as a kid growing 
up in Utah, as one of his friends and colleagues 
said.  And he’s never forgotten that kid from 
Ogden.” 
The views expressed in this report are those of the author, and do not 
necessarily reflect the positions of any of the institutions to which she is 
affiliated, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, the Bush School of Government and 
Public Service, or Texas A&M University. 
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1 This paper and the book from which it is derived would not be possible were it not for Brent Scowcroft giving generously of his time to agree to dozens of interviews over five-plus-year period, about one per month (January 2009 though May 2014).  I am also grateful to the others who were willing to talk to me about the General or the events of which they were part.  I am also very thankful for the assistance of the archivists, photo librarians, and technicians at the Bush Presidential Library.  I would also like to thank Prof. Michael Desch, who vouched for me in late 2006 when General Scowcroft asked him about me, learning of my interest in writing his biography.  I am especially appreciative of Dr. Andrew Natsios, Executive Professor and Director, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, for inviting me to talk about Scowcroft at a symposium held in his honor on April 28, 2016, and for encouraging me to write up and polish my remarks.  2 All quotations and evidence are drawn from my biography of Brent Scowcroft (Bartholomew Sparrow, The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security.  New York: PublicAffairs Press, 2015).  3 Brent Scowcroft, “The Iran deal: An epochal moment that Congress shouldn’t squander, The 
Washington Post, August 21, 2015; General Scowcroft, Frank Miller, and Stephen Hadley, “NATO-based nuclear weapons are an advantage in a dangerous world,” The Washington Post, August 17, 2014.  4 Also see Bartholomew H. Sparrow, “Realism’s Practitioner: Brent Scowcroft and American Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 34 No. 1 (January 2010), 141-175.  5 Brent Scowcroft, “Don't’ Attack Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002, A-12.  6 Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. president talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world,” The Atlantic (April 2016), 70-90.                  
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Bartholomew Sparrow, PhD: 
 
 Bartholomew Sparrow is Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin.  Sparrow 
is the author of The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security; The Insular Cases and 
the Emergence of American Empire; Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a Political Institution; and 
From the Outside In: World War II and the American State.  He is the co-editor of two other books and 
author and co-author of many articles and book chapters.  Sparrow has received fellowships from the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Fulbright Program, the Shorenstein Center on the 
Media, Politics and Public Policy, and the Harry S. Truman Library Institute.  He has been awarded the 
Franklin L. Burdette Pi Sigma Alpha and Leonard D. White awards from the American Political Science 
Association.  He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and an A.B. from 
Dartmouth College. 
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The Bush School of Government and Public Service 
 
Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Dean and Executive Professor 
 
Founded in 1997, the Bush School of Government and Public Service has become one of the leading public 
and international affairs graduate schools in the nation. One of ten schools and colleges at Texas A&M 
University, a tier-one research university, the School offers master’s level education for students aspiring 
to careers in public service.  
 
The School is ranked in the top 12 percent of graduate public affairs schools in the nation, according to 
rankings published in U.S. News & World Report. The School now ranks thirty-third among both public 
and private public affairs graduate programs and twenty-first among public universities.  
 
The School’s philosophy is based on the belief of its founder, George H.W. Bush, that public service is a 
noble calling—a belief that continues to shape all aspects of the curriculum, research, and student 
experience. In addition to the Master of Public Service and Administration degree and the Master of 
International Affairs degree, the School has an expanding online and extended education program that 
includes Certificates in Advanced International Affairs, Homeland Security, and Nonprofit Management. 
 
Located in College Station, Texas, the School’s programs are housed in the Robert H. and Judy Ley Allen 
Building, which is part of the George Bush Presidential Library Center on the West Campus of Texas A&M. 
This location affords students access to the archival holdings of the George Bush Presidential Library and 
Museum, invitation to numerous events hosted by the George Bush Foundation at the Annenberg 
Presidential Conference Center, and inclusion in the many activities of the Texas A&M community. 
 
 
The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs 
 
Andrew S. Natsios, Director and Executive Professor 
 
The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is a research institute housed in the Bush 
School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. The Institute is named in 
honor of Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), whose long and distinguished career in public 
service included serving as National Security Advisor for Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. 
Bush. The Institute's core mission is to foster and disseminate policy-oriented research on 
international affairs by supporting faculty and student research, hosting international speakers and 
major scholarly conferences, and providing grants to outside researchers to use the holdings of the 
Bush Library.  
 
"We live in an era of tremendous global change. Policy makers will confront unfamiliar 
challenges, new opportunities, and difficult choices in the years ahead. I look forward to the 
Scowcroft Institute supporting policy-relevant research that will contribute to our understanding 
of these changes, illuminating their implications for our national interest, and fostering lively 
exchanges about how the United States can help shape a world that best serves our interests and 
reflects our values."  
 
— Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)      13  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
